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(Cape Town, 12 September 1995)

1. On how the Nordic support to the Southern African liberation movements was viewed in Moscow:

"I do not think that there was any negative opinion about that. I remember a discussion I had with the ANC Treasurer General, Thomas Nkobi, in the mid-1980s. He said that the Soviet Union had been very correct when it in the 1960s recommended ANC to work for more financial support in the West."

2. On why Sweden supported the liberation movements:

"Sweden and some other countries should be given credit for having the foresight to know that changes were inevitable and that their contribution—or investment, if we use a word which I do not like very much—in the liberation process would be paid back one way or another. But that might not have been the decisive factor, because the humanitarian traditions in Sweden are very strong and there was pressure from the grassroots, from political organizations, churches and, in general, liberal, humanitarian personalities. However, the direct support to the liberation movements was very small in the beginning. The policy could have been introduced by the Social Democratic leaders to diffuse internal pressures from the more radical solidarity movements. There was an element of that. In Russian, you would say that it served as a lightning conductor. There was a combination of factors, humanitarian, political and economic.

I am a bit sceptical to the assistance in the beginning. The amounts given were very small as far as ANC, SWAPO, ZAPU and ZANU are

concerned. Of course, MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC used to get sizeable amounts and after the Portuguese revolution the situation changed with regard to Zimbabwe, Namibia and even South Africa.

When Olof Palme became vice-president of the Socialist International in, I think, 1976, there was a certain breakthrough. The Socialist International sent a mission to Southern Africa, but that was to a large extent Palme's own project.

It is interesting to note that the policy of Sweden did not change when there was a change in government. In 1976, when the Social Democrats lost the elections for the first time in many years, there was no decrease in the assistance to the liberation movements. In fact, during the years that the so-called bourgeois coalition was ruling, the assistance increased. Maybe the support was not so much social democratic policy, but a kind of national policy. Here, of course, the question is what was behind it. Economic interests, general feelings in Sweden or what?

This was also the case in Norway. When Norway hosted the 1973 OAU/UN conference, the Labour Party was not in power. But the bourgeois government went to the conference as if nothing had happened. It is rather interesting".

3. On Nordic support to the so-called 'authentic six' and ZANU:

"All these movements were the leading organizations at that time. Maybe with the exception of Angola, where FNLA tried to become the leader. They signed this unfortunate

agreement with MPLA in December 1972 which nobody remembers any more and which became one of the problems between the Soviet Union and MPLA at that time. FNLA claimed to be stronger than MPLA, but it was very much discredited.

I think that pragmatism guided Sweden and the other Nordic countries. They were also well informed, because they were quite close to the liberation movements, at least from the mid-1970s. The 'authentic six' were stronger and cleaner, if you could use these words. For example, COREMO in Mozambique was nothing and PAC had an unfortunate history of stealing and killing in exile. But I know that Sweden had some contacts with PAC, although it did not result in anything. Some support would go to PAC through the United Nations, but Sweden did not give them any direct support."

**4. On the role of the Nordic countries:**

"By and large, I think that the Nordic countries played a very constructive role, both politically and in a broader sense. Politically, because they served as a kind of bridge between the Southern African liberation movements and the West in general. I have also seen in the ANC archives that ANC at one stage wanted to concentrate on the smaller countries when the big Western countries were playing a bad role in South Africa. In the late 1980s, big groups of ANC people came to study in Sweden within the PASA project, Post-Apartheid South Africa. Big money was apparently involved in this project. It was very prominent at some stage, but it seems that it then just faded and disappeared."

**5. On the Nordic countries and Communism in the liberation movements:**

"I was present at the 1984 Socialist International meeting in Arusha, Tanzania, which was organized by a Preparatory Committee headed by Professor Ki-Zerbo from Burkina Faso. It was a bit funny. We did not hide from the Social Democrats, but when people came to the meeting the organizers were openly telling ANC members that they were worried about the influence of Communists and the Soviet Union. They were saying this to South African Communists! It was a bit stupid. They were open about their negative agenda. They did not just say that they wanted to increase their support, but also that they wanted to diminish the Communist influence. That was a

bit primitive. If they wanted to influence things, they should at least have known who they were talking to."

**6. On the 1973 OAU/UN conference in Oslo:**

"The Oslo conference was a bit of a breakthrough, but even the Scandinavian governments down-played it. Firstly, there was a lot of talk about the name and scope of the conference. It was a 'conference of experts to support victims of colonialism and apartheid', but we said that we were not there as only so-called experts, but as supporters of the liberation movements. They then tried as much as possible to portray us all as non-governmental representatives, although it was a conference of the United Nations and the OAU. Secondly, in Oslo one could see the difference in attitude of the Norwegian hosts—maybe also of the Swedes—towards the liberation movements from the Portuguese colonies and the other movements. In spite of his status, Oliver Tambo—who was the highest representative—was not given suitable treatment compared with the Portuguese anti-colonial movements. SWAPO was led by Shipanga and ZANU by Chitepo. I do not remember who was there from ZAPU, but it was not a high-ranking representative."

**7. On the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF):**

"I think that one must highlight the role of IUEF. I used to know Lars-Gunnar Eriksson. I was rather friendly with him in the 1970s. We met in Moscow. He was a very interesting fellow. Of course, IUEF was very much discredited by the Craig Williamson affair, but you should not close the whole issue of IUEF because of that. IUEF played a very important role, although controversial. For example, it was stated in the press—I do not know if it was correct or not—that there was some secret funding through IUEF to dissidents of ANC, but by and large it played a very important role. At some stage, the bulk of the Nordic assistance to the liberation movements was going through IUEF and not directly from the governments. A lot was done by IUEF in the early 1970s. I am sure that the Nordic assistance through IUEF then was bigger than the direct support, which was rather limited.

IUEF played a particular role, because they could send people inside South Africa to have a look. For example, they were a major channel of support to the South African Students

Organisation and the Black Consciousness Movement. I remember that Lars-Gunnar Eriksson told me about it and I said to him that it was about time that we also contacted them. He then said—boasting a bit, but still—‘OK, give me two weeks and I will organize it in Nairobi’. Or, ‘give me three days and I will organize it in Botswana’. He was serious.”

**8. On IUEF, MPLA and the Soviet Union:**

“The information that Lars-Gunnar Eriksson gave me on Angola was very important. It was at his place in Geneva, towards the end of August or at the beginning of September 1974. I was in Geneva to attend an OAU/UN conference on colonialism.

The background was the agreement between Neto and Roberto in December 1972, which almost nobody mentions in the literature and through which Neto was to be second to Roberto. It was a mistake and became a problem for us at that time. I was present when Neto came to the Soviet Union after the agreement and he tried to explain the needs for it. Our people were not convinced and the assistance was suspended. Not stopped in the full sense, because there were still MPLA students in the Soviet Union and the military supplies continued. It would have been rather difficult to also give political support to FNLA. The agreement immediately lowered the prestige of MPLA.

The IUEF people were almost the only ones who were present at the 1974 MPLA Congress and at the Inter-Regional Conference. It was important. At the congress, it was officially said that they had elected Daniel Chipenda as MPLA President, but they then had this conference inside Angola where they over-ruled that decision. It was very controversial. Lars-Gunnar Eriksson told me about this and about the importance of support to MPLA. The IUEF position was very good. They absolutely supported Neto, which was very important. It helped our people in Moscow to better understand the situation, so credit must go to IUEF and to Lars-Gunnar Eriksson.”